A distributed binary hypothesis testing problem involving two parties, a remote observer and a detector, is studied. The remote observer has access to a discrete memoryless source, and communicates its observations to the detector via a rate-limited noiseless channel. The detector observes another discrete memoryless source, and performs a binary hypothesis test on the joint distribution of its own observations with those of the observer. While the goal of the observer is to maximize the type 2 error exponent of the test for a given type 1 error probability constraint, it also wants to keep a private part of its observations as oblivious to the detector as possible. Considering both equivocation and average distortion as possible measures of privacy, the trade-off between the communication rate from the observer to the detector, the type 2 error exponent and privacy is studied. For the general hypothesis testing problem, we establish single-letter inner bounds on both the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs. Subsequently, single-letter characterizations for both trade-offs are obtained (i) for testing against conditional independence of the observer's observations from those of the detector, given some additional side-information at the detector; and (ii) when the communication rate constraint over the channel is zero. Finally, we show by providing a counterexample that, the strong converse which holds for distributed hypothesis testing without a privacy constraint, does not hold when a privacy constraint is imposed. This implies that, in general, the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs are not independent of the type 1 error probability constraint.
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The amount of private information leakage that can be tolerated depends on the specific application at hand. While it may be possible to tolerate a moderate amount of private information leakage in applications like online shopping or social networks, it may no longer be the case in matters related to information sharing among government agencies or corporates. While it is obvious that maximum privacy can be attained by revealing no information, this typically comes at the cost of zero utility.
On the other hand, maximum utility can be achieved by revealing all the information, but at the cost of minimum privacy.
Characterizing the optimal trade-off between the utility and the minimum privacy leakage between these two extremes is a challenging research problem.
It is important to note here that the data privacy problem is fundamentally different from that of data security against an eavesdropper or an adversary. In data security, sensitive data is to be protected against an external malicious agent distinct from the legitimate parties in the system. The techniques for guaranteeing data security usually involve either cryptographic methods in which the legitimate parties are assumed to have additional resources unavailable to the adversary (e.g., a shared private key) or the availability of better communication channel conditions. However, in data privacy problems, the sensitive data is to be protected from the same legitimate party that provides the utility; and hence, the above mentioned techniques for guaranteeing data security are not applicable.
Main Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
(i) In Section III, Theorem 8 (resp. Theorem 9), we establish a single-letter inner bound on the rate-T2EE-equivocation (resp. rate-T2EE-distortion) trade-off for distributed HT with a privacy constraint.
(ii) Exact characterizations are obtained for some important special cases in Section IV. More specifically, a single-letter characterization of the optimal rate-T2EE-equivocation (resp. rate-T2EE-distortion) trade-off is established for: a) TACI with a privacy constraint (for vanishing type 1 error probability constraint) in Section IV-A, Theorem 10 (resp. Theorem 11). b) distributed HT with a privacy constraint for zero-rate compression (R = 0) in Section IV-B, Theorem 15 (resp. Theorem 14).
Since the optimal trade-offs in Theorem 14 and Theorem 15 are independent of the constraint on the type 1 error probability, they are strong converse results in the context of HT.
(iii) Finally, in Section V, we provide a counterexample showing that for positive rate R > 0, the strong converse result does not hold in general for TAI with a privacy constraint. 
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations
All the random variables (r.v.'s) considered in this paper are discrete with finite support unless specified otherwise. We denote r.v.'s and their realizations by upper and lower case letters (e.g., X and x), respectively. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g., the alphabet of a r.v. X is denoted by X . Sequence of r.v.'s (X 1 , . . . , X n ) will be denoted by X n . The group of m r.v's X (j−1)m+1 , . . . , X jm is denoted by X m (j), and the infinite sequence X m (1), X m (2), . . . is denoted by {X m (j)} j∈Z + .
D(P X ||Q X ), H P X (X), H P XY (X|Y ) and I P XY (X; Y ) represent the standard quantities of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between distributions P X and Q X , the entropy of X with distribution P X , the conditional entropy of X given Y and the mutual information between X and Y with joint distribution P XY , respectively. When the distribution of the r.v.'s involved are clear from the context, the entropic and mutual information quantities are denoted simply by I(X; Y ), H(X) and H(X|Y ),
respectively. Following the notation in [37] , T P and T
or T m δ when there is no ambiguity) denote the set of sequences of type P and the set of P X -typical sequences of length m, respectively. The set of all types of k-length sequences of r.v.'s X k and Y k is denoted by T k (X × Y) and ∪ k∈Z + T k (X × Y) is denoted by T (X × Y). Given realizations X n = x n and Y n = y n , H e (x n |y n ) denotes the conditional empirical entropy defined as H e (x n |y n ) := H PXỸ (X|Ỹ )
where PXỸ denotes the joint type of (x n , y n ). 1 denotes the indicator function. X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain between the r.v.'s X, Y and Z, while X ⊥ Y denotes statistical independence between X and Y .
(n) − − → denotes asymptotic limit with respect to n, e.g., a n (n) − − → 0 means the sequence a n tends to zero asymptotically with n. P(E) denotes the probability of event E. For positive real m, we define [m] := {1, . . . , m }. For an arbitrary set A, we denote its complement by A c , and for A ⊆ R n , we denote its interior and closure by int(A) and cl(A) (with respect to the Euclidean metric), respectively. Whenever the range of the summation is not specified, this will mean summation over the entire support, e.g., u denotes u∈U , unless specified otherwise. Throughout this paper, the base of the logarithms is taken to be e. For a ∈ R, a + denotes max{0, a}. For two probability distributions P and Q defined on a common support X , P << Q will mean that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q.
B. Problem formulation
Consider the HT setup illustrated in Fig. 1 . The encoder (observer) observes a discrete memoryless source U n and sends the message index M := f (n) (U n ) to the detector over an error-free channel using some encoding function (possibly stochastic)
. Given its own independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) observation V n , the detector performs a HT on the joint distribution 1 of U n and V n with null hypothesis
and alternate hypothesis
Let H,Ĥ ∈ {0, 1} denote the r.v.'s corresponding to the true hypothesis and the output of the HT, respectively, where 0 denotes the null hypothesis and 1 the alternate hypothesis. Let g (n) : M × V n → {PĤ |M,V n } denote the decision rule at the detector.
The type 1 and type 2 error probability for an (f (n) , g (n) ) pair are defined as α f (n) , g (n) := P(Ĥ = 1|H = 0) = PĤ (1), andβ f (n) , g (n) := P(Ĥ = 0|H = 1) = QĤ (0), respectively, where
and QĤ (0) =
For a given type 1 error probability constraint , define the minimum type 2 error probability over all possible detectors as
The performance of HT is measured by the T2EE achieved by the test for a given constraint on the type 1 error probability, i.e., lim inf n→∞ − 1 n log β(f (n) , ) . Although the goal of the detector is to maximize the T2EE achieved for the HT, it is also curious about a latent r.v. S n that is correlated with the source U n . S n is referred to as the private part of U n , which is distributed i.i.d. according to the joint distribution P SU V and Q SU V under the null and alternate hypothesis, respectively. It is desired to keep the private part as concealed as possible from the detector. We consider two measures of privacy for S n at the 1 Although a r.v. is specified together with its probability distribution, here, we abuse the notation for ease of exposition, and denote the observations at the observer and detector under both the null and alternate hypothesis by (U n , V n ), with probability distribution
This terminology is used throughout the paper.
detector. The first is the equivocation defined as
The second one is the average distortion between S n and its reconstructionŜ n at the detector, measured according to an arbitrary bounded additive distortion metric d :
with multi-letter distortion defined as
The goal is to ensure that the T2EE for HT is maximized, while satisfying the constraints on the type 1 error probability and the privacy of S n . In the sequel, we study the trade-off between the rate, T2EE (henceforth also referred to simply as the error exponent) and privacy achieved in the above setting. Before delving into that, a few definitions are in order.
Definition 1. For a given type 1 error probability constraint , a rate-error exponent-distortion tuple (R, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) is achievable, if there exists a sequence of encoding and decoding functions f (n) :
lim inf
where g (n) r
: [e nR ]×V n → {PŜ n |M,V n } and PŜ n |M,V n denotes an arbitrary conditional probability distribution. The rate-error exponent-distortion region R d ( ) is the closure of the set of all such achievable (R, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) tuples for a given .
Definition 2. For a given type 1 error probability constraint , a rate-error exponent-equivocation (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) tuple is achievable, if there exists a sequence of encoding and decoding functions f (n) :
The rate-error exponent-equivocation region R e ( ) is the closure of the set of all achievable (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) tuples for a given .
Before stating our results, we briefly highlight the differences between our system model and the one studied in [28] . In [28] , the observer applies a memoryless privacy mechanism to the data before releasing it to the transmitter, which performs further encoding prior to transmission to the detector, while in our model, there is no such restriction, as is obvious from the definitions above. Also, while we consider the equivocation (or average distortion) between the revealed information and the private part as the privacy measure, in [28] , the mutual information between the observer's observations and the output of the memoryless mechanism is the privacy measure. Thus, perfect privacy in their model would imply that the T2EE is also zero, since the output of the memoryless mechanism has to be independent of the observer's observations (under both hypothesis).
However, as we show in Example 1 later, a positive T2EE is achievable while guaranteeing perfect privacy in our model.
Next, we state some supporting results that will be useful later for proving the main results.
C. Supporting Results
First, we show that restricting our attention to a deterministic detector g (n) : [e nR ] × V n → {0, 1} in Definitions 1 and 2 is without loss of optimality. Accordingly, let
denote the deterministic detector with acceptance region A (n) ⊆ [e nR ] × V n for H 0 and A c (n) for H 1 . Then, the type 1 and type 2 error probabilities are given bȳ
Proposition 3. It is sufficient to consider a deterministic detector of the form given in (5) for some
A (n) and A c (n) denote the acceptance regions for H 0 and H 1 , respectively.
Proof: Note that for a stochastic detector, the type 1 and type 2 error probabilities are linear functions of PĤ |M V n . As a result, for each fixed n and
can be thought of as the type 1 and type 2 errors achieved by "time sharing" among a finite number of deterministic detectors. Now, suppose (ᾱ
and (ᾱ
2 ) denote the pair of type 1 and type 2 error probabilities achieved by deterministic detectors g (n) 1 generality (w.l.o.g), it is also sufficient to consider g (n) r (in Definition 1) to be a deterministic function of the form
for the minimization in (3), where
, denotes an arbitrary deterministic function.
Proposition 4. For the minimization in (3), it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a deterministic function g (n) r as given in (8) .
S n U n V n M denote the joint distribution of the r.v.'s (S n , U n , V n , M ) under hypothesis H j , j = 0, 1, and
r . Then, we have
where,
Continuing, we have
Next, we state some lemmas that will be handy for upper bounding the amount of privacy leakage in the proofs of the main results stated below. The following one is a well known result proved in [37] that upper bounds the difference in entropy of two r.v.'s (with a common support) in terms of the total variation distance between their probability distributions.
Definition 5. The total variation between probability distributions P X and Q X defined on the same support X is defined as
Lemma 6. [37, Lemma 2.7] Let P X and Q X be distributions defined on a common support X and let ρ := ||P X − Q X ||.
Then,
The next lemma will be used later in the proofs of Theorem 8, Theorem 9, Theorem 14 and counter-example for strong converse in Section V.
Lemma 7. Let P XY and Q XY denote two arbitrary joint probability distributions of the r.v.'s X and
Q XY denote probability distributions of the r.v.'s X n and Y n . For δ > 0, define
If P X = Q X , then for δ > 0 sufficiently small,
If P X = Q X , then the following holds for any δ > 0,
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
To provide further intuition into the claims given in (11)- (13) of Lemma 7, we briefly explain each of them. Eqn. (11) states that if the marginals P X and Q X are different, then the conditional distribution
, is close (in terms of total variation distance) to the unconditional distribution Q Y n , provided that δ is small enough. This essentially means that the conditional distribution Q Y n , conditioned on the knowledge that X n is not P X -typical, does not differ much from the unconditional distribution asymptotically. Similarly, (12) and (13) , respectively, state that given P X = Q X , the conditional
any value of δ > 0. This implies that the knowledge of X n being P X -typical does not change the marginal distribution of Y n by much asymptotically.
In the next section, we establish an inner bound on R e ( ) and R d ( ).
III. MAIN RESULTS
The following two theorems are the main results of this paper providing inner bounds for R e ( ) and R d ( ), respectively.
there exists an auxiliary r.v. W , such that (V, S) − U − W , and
where
Theorem 8 is the direct part or the achievability result in the parlance of information theory, and utilizes the well-known coding techniques of quantization and binning, along with minimum empirical entropy decoding using the available sideinformation at the detector. While the analysis of the T2EE is similar to that of the Shimokawa-Han-Amari scheme [7] , the analysis of the privacy part is new. Indeed, we recover the rate-T2EE trade-off derived in [7] when the privacy constraint in Theorem 8 is relaxed. The detailed proof of Theorem 8 is presented in Appendix B. We next state an inner bound for R d ( ). 
and
are satisfied, where P SU V W and Q SU V W are as defined in Theorem 8.
The proof of Theorem 9 is presented in Appendix C. We mention an important point regarding average distortion as a privacy measure. In order to obtain a single-letter lower bound for the achievable distortion of the private part at the detector, it is required that the aposteriori probability distribution of S n given the observations (M, V n ) at the detector is close in some sense to a desired "target" memoryless distribution (as will become apparent from the proof). For this purpose, we use stochastic encoding to induce the necessary randomness for S n at the detector. The analysis of the joint distribution of the r.v.'s in the system (both the given r.v.'s and those generated as part of the coding scheme) is done using the so-called channel resolvability or soft-covering lemma [38] - [40] . Properties of the total variation distance between probability distributions play a key role in this analysis.
Theorems 8 and 9 provide single-letter inner bounds on R d ( ) and R e ( ), respectively. A complete computable characterization of these regions would require a matching converse. This is a hard problem, since such a characterization is not available even for the distributed HT problem in general, without a privacy constraint (see [5] ). However, it is known that a single-letter characterization of the rate-error exponent region exists for the special case of TACI [11] . In the next section, we
show that TACI with a privacy constraint also admits a single-letter characterization, in addition to other optimality results.
IV. OPTIMALITY RESULTS FOR SPECIAL CASES
A. TACI with a Privacy Constraint
Assume that the detector observes two discrete memoryless sources Y n and Z n , i.e., V n = (Y n , Z n ). In TACI, the detector tests for the conditional independence of U and Y , given Z. Thus, the joint distribution of the r.v.'s under the null and alternate hypothesis are given by
respectively.
Let R e and R d denote the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion regions, respectively, for the case of vanishing type 1 error probability constraint, i.e.,
Assume that the privacy constraint under the alternate hypothesis is inactive. Thus, we are interested in characterizing the set of all tuples (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) ∈ R e and (R, κ,
Note that Ω min and ∆ min correspond to the equivocation and average distortion of S n at the detector, respectively, when U n is available directly at the detector under the alternate hypothesis. The above assumption is motivated by scenarios, in which, the encoder is more eager to protect S n when there is a correlation between its own observation and that of the decoder. Consider the following example of user privacy in the context of online shopping, in which the encoder and detector correspond to a consumer and an online shopping portal, respectively. A consumer would like to share some information about his/her shopping behaviour, e.g., shopping history and preferences, with the shopping portal in order to get better deals and recommendations on relevant products. The shopping portal would like to determine whether the consumer belongs to its target age group (e.g., below 30 years old) before sending special offers to this customer. Assuming that the shopping patterns of the users within and outside the target age groups are independent, the shopping portal performs an independence test to check if the consumer's shared data is correlated with the data of its own customers. If the consumer is indeed within the target age group, the shopping portal would like to gather more information about this potential customer, particular interests, more accurate age estimation, etc.; while the user is reluctant to provide any further information. In this example, U n , S n and Y n corresponds to shopping behaviour, more information about the customer, and customers data available to the shopping portal, respectively.
For the above mentioned case, we have the following results.
Theorem 10. (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω min ) ∈ R e if and only if there exists an auxiliary r.v. W , such that (Z, Y, S) − U − W , and
for some joint distribution of the form P SU Y ZW := P SU Y Z P W |U .
Proof: For TACI, the inner bound in Theorem 8 yields that for ∈ (0, 1), (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) ∈ R e ( ) if there exists an auxiliary r.v. W , such that (Y, Z, S) − U − W , and
Note that since (Y, Z, S) − U − W , we have
Let B := {P W |U : I P (U ; W |Z) ≤ R}. Then, for P W |U ∈ B , we have,
Hence,
By noting that Ω min ≤ H Q (S|W, Y, Z) (by the data processing inequality), we have shown that for (25)- (27) are satisfied. This completes the proof of achievability.
and independent of all the other r.v.'s
Then, for any γ > 0 and sufficiently large n, we have
Here, (36) follows since the sequences (U n , Z n ) are memoryless; (37) follows since
(38) follows from the fact that T is independent of all the other r.v.'s.
The equivocation of source S n under the null hypothesis can be bounded as follows.
Finally, we prove the upper bound on κ. For any encoding function f (n) and decision region
Here, (41) follows from the log-sum inequality [37] . Thus,
where (42) follows since
The last term can be single-letterized as follows.
Substituting (44) in (43), we obtain
This completes the proof of the converse and the theorem.
Next, we state the result for TACI with a distortion privacy constraint, where the distortion is measured using an arbitrary 
for some P SU Y ZW as defined in Theorem 10.
Proof: The proof of achievability follows from Theorem 9, similarly to the way Theorem 10 is obtained from Theorem 8. Hence, only differences will be highlighted. Similar to the inequality Ω min ≤ H Q (S|U, Y, Z) in the proof of Theorem 10, we need to prove the inequality
, where Q SU Y ZW := Q SU Y Z P W |U for some conditional distribution P W |U . This can be shown as follows.
where, in (49), φ * (u, y, z) is chosen such that
Converse: Let W = (W T , T ) denote the auxiliary r.v. defined in the converse of Theorem 10. Inequalities (46) and (47) follow similarly as obtained in Theorem 10. We prove (48).
In (50), we used the fact that (9) holds for any arbitrary joint distribution on the r.v.'
A more general version of Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 is claimed in [41] as Theorem 7 and Theorem 8, respectively, in which a privacy constraint under the alternate hypothesis is also imposed. However, we have identified a mistake in the converse proof; and hence, a single-letter characterization for this general problem remains open.
To complete the single-letter characterization in Theorem 10 and Theorem 11, we bound the alphabet size of the auxiliary r.v. W .
Proposition 12.
In Theorem 10 and 11, it suffices to consider auxiliary r.v.'s W such that |W| ≤ |U| + 2.
Proof: Consider the |U| + 2 functions of P U |W ,
Thus, by the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory's theorem [42] , it is sufficient to have at most |U| − 1 points in the support of W to preserve P U and three more to preserve H P (U |W, Z), H P (Y |W, Z) and H P (S|W, Z, Y ). Noting that H P (Y |Z) and H P (U |Z) are automatically preserved since P U is preserved (and (Y, Z, S)−U −W holds), |W| = |U|+2 points are sufficient to preserve the R.H.S. of equations (25)- (27) . This completes the proof for the case of R e . Similarly, considering the |U| + 1 functions of P W |U given in (51)-(53) and
where, g 4 (w,
similar result holds also for the case of R d . 
for some P SU Y ZW as in Theorem 10. Similarly, we have that (R, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) ∈ R d if and only if there exist an auxiliary r.v.
W and a deterministic function φ : W × Y × Z →Ŝ such that (57), (58),
are satisfied for some P SU Y ZW as in Theorem 10.
Having established a single-letter characterization of R e (resp. R d ), we briefly mention that this result can also be obtained via the single-letter characterization of the rate-equivocation (resp. rate-distortion) trade-off for an equivalent source-coding problem shown in Fig. 2 , which we refer to as the source-coding problem in the presence of a helper with a privacy constraint.
As it may be of interest on its own, the detailed description of this problem along with a proof of its equivalence to TACI with a privacy constraint is provided in Appendix D.
Theorem 10 (resp. Theorem 11) provide a characterization of R e (resp. R d ) under the condition of vanishing type 1 error probability constraint. Consequently, the converse part of these results are known as weak converse results in the context of HT.
In the next subsection, we establish the optimal error exponent-privacy trade-off for the special case of zero-rate compression.
This trade-off is independent of the type 1 error probability constraint ∈ (0, 1), and hence known as a strong converse result.
B. Zero-rate compression
Assume the following zero-rate constraint on the communication between the observer and the detector,
Note that (63) does not imply that |M| = 0, i.e., nothing can be transmitted, but that the message set cardinality can grow at most sub-exponentially in n. Such a scenario is motivated practically by low power or low bandwidth constrained applications in which communication is costly. Theorems 14 and 15 stated below provide an optimal single-letter characterization of R d ( )
and R e ( ) in this case. While the coding schemes in the achievability part of these results are inspired from that in [6] , the analysis of privacy achieved at the detector is new. Intuitively, Theorem 15 is based on the fact that at zero-rate, the equivocation of the private part remains essentially unaffected with the knowledge of the message M , and we may borrow results from distributed HT without a privacy constraint problem. On the other hand, to establish Theorem 14, a more detailed analysis of average distortion of S n at the detector is required, which involves showing that the conditional joint distribution of the private part and the detector's observations given M is close (in terms of the total variation distance) to the unconditional distribution.
Lemma 7 serves as a crucial tool for this purpose. We next state the results.
where φ : V →Ŝ is a deterministic function and
Proof: First, we prove that (0, κ, ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) satisfying (64)- (66) is achievable. While the encoding and decoding scheme is the same as that in [6] , we mention it for the sake of completeness.
Encoding: The encoder sends the message
, δ > 0, and M = 0 otherwise.
We analyze the type 1 and type 2 error probabilities for the above scheme as δ → 0. First, note by the weak law of large numbers, that, for any δ > 0,
Hence, the type 1 error probability tends to zero, asymptotically. The type 2 error can be written as follows.
Next, we lower bound the average distortion for S n achieved by this scheme at the detector. First, note that
This implies that
≥ min
for some sequences of positive numbers {γ 1n } n∈Z + and {γ 2n } n∈Z + , such that γ 1n
− − → 0. Here, (70) follows from (67), and (71) follows from (13), Property 2(b) in [43] and the boundedness of the distortion measure, respectively. The average distortion can be bounded similarly under the alternate hypothesis using (68) and (12) when Q U = P U , and using (69) and (11) when Q U = P U . This completes the proof of the achievability.
We next prove the converse. Note that by the strong converse result in [8] , the R.H.S of (64) is an upper bound on the achievable T2EE for all ∈ (0, 1) even without a privacy constraint (hence, also with a privacy constraint). Also,
= min
Here, (72) follows from the fact that the detector can always reconstructŜ i as a function of V n . Similarly,
Hence, any achievable Ω 0 and Ω 1 has to satisfy (65) and (66), respectively. This completes the proof.
The following theorem is the analogous result to Theorem 14 when the privacy measure is equivocation.
Theorem 15. For ∈ (0, 1), (0, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) ∈ R e ( ) if and only if it satisfies (64) and
Proof: For proving the achievablity part, the encoding and decoding scheme is the same as in Theorem 14. Note that the following inequality holds for j = 0, 1;
Then, (63) and (75) imply that
for some γ 3n
− − → 0. Notice that the message M does not play a role in the values of equivocation of S n at the detector asymptotically. Hence, any T2EE that is achievable under zero-rate compression without a privacy constraint is also achievable under an equivocation constraint. Hence, it follows from the results in [6] and [8] that the R.H.S of (64) is the optimal T2EE
achievable for all values of ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it is clear from (76) that an (Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) pair satisfying (73) and (74) is achievable, and that the R.H.S. of (73) (resp. (74)) is an upper bound for any achievable Ω 0 (resp. Ω 1 ). This concludes the proof.
In Section II-B, we mentioned that it is possible to achieve a positive T2EE with perfect privacy in our model. Here, we provide an example of TAI with an equivocation privacy constraint under both hypothesis, and show that perfect privacy is possible. Recall that TAI is a special case of TACI, in which, Z = constant, and hence, the null and alternate hypothesis are given by
H P (U ) = 2 bits. Also, noting that under the null hypothesis, Y = U mod 2, H P (S|Y ) = 2 bits. It follows from the inner bound given by equations (28)
where P SU Y W := P SU Y P W |U and Q SU Y W := Q SU Y P W |U for some conditional distribution P W |U . If we set W := U mod 2, then we have I P (U ; W ) = 1 bit, I P (Y ; W ) = H P (Y ) = 1 bit, H P (S|W, Y ) = H P (S|Y ) = 2 bits, and H Q (S|W ) = H P (S|Y ) = 2 bits. Thus, by revealing only W to the detector, it is possible to achieve a positive T2EE while ensuring maximum privacy under both the null and alternate hypothesis, i.e., the tuple (1, 1, 2, 2) ∈ R e ( ), ∀ ∈ (0, 1).
V. A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE STRONG CONVERSE
Ahlswede and Csiszár obtained a strong converse result for the distributed HT problem without a privacy constraint in [5] , where they showed that for any positive rate R, the optimal achievable T2EE is independent of the type 1 error probability constraint . Here, we explore whether a similar result holds in our model, in which, an additional privacy constraint is imposed.
We will show through a counterexample that this is not the case in general.
Assume that the joint distribution P SU V is such that H P (S|U, V ) < H P (S|V ). Proving the strong converse amounts to
showing that any (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) ∈ R e ( ) for some ∈ (0, 1) also belongs to R e . Consider TAI problem with an equivocation privacy constraint, in which, R ≥ H P (U ) and Ω 1 ≤ Ω min . Then, from the optimal single-letter characterization of R e given in Theorem 10, it follows by taking W = U that (H P (U ), I P (V ; U ), H P (S|V, U ), Ω min ) ∈ R e . Note that I P (V ; U ) is the maximum T2EE achievable for any type 1 error probability constraint ∈ (0, 1), even when U n is observed directly at the detector. Thus, for vanishing type 1 error probability constraint → 0 and κ = I P (V ; U ), the term H P (S|V, U ) denotes the maximum achievable equivocation for S n under the null hypothesis. From the proof of Theorem 10, it follows that the coding scheme for achieving this tuple is as follows.
where j is the index of u n in C U , else, send M = 0.
2) At the detector, if
The type 1 error probability of the above scheme tends to zero asymptotically with n. Now, for a fixed * > 0, consider a modification of this coding scheme as follows.
1) If
, send M = j with probability 1 − * , where j is the index of u n in C U , and with probability * ,
It is easy to see that for this modified coding scheme, the type 1 error probability is asymptotically equal to * , while the T2EE remains the same as I(V ; U ) since the probability of declaringĤ = 0 is decreased. Defining I U (u
we also have that
for some γ > 0 such that γ ∈ O(δ), γ n is defined in (86) below, {γ n } n∈Z + denotes some sequence of positive numbers such that γ n
Equation (77) follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 in [44] . Equation (78) is obtained as follows.
Here, (84) is obtained by an application of Lemma 6; and (85) is due to the assumption that H P (S|U, V ) < H P (S|V ).
It follows from Lemma 7 that ρ * n (n) − − → 0, which in turn implies that
From (81), (82) and (88), we have thatγ n
for some Ω * 0 > H P (S|U, V ). Since (H P (U ), I P (V ; U ), Ω * 0 , Ω min ) / ∈ R e , this implies that in general, the strong converse does not hold for HT with an equivocation privacy constraint. The same counterexample can be used in a similar manner to show that the strong converse does not hold for HT with an average distortion privacy constraint either.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the distributed HT problem with a privacy constraint, with equivocation and average distortion as the measures of privacy. We have established a single-letter inner bound on the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs. We have also obtained the optimal rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponentdistortion trade-offs for two special cases, when the communication rate over the channel is zero, and for TACI under a privacy constraint. It is interesting to note that the strong converse for distributed HT does not hold when there is an additional privacy constraint in the system. Thus, the problem studied here provides a counterexample to the folklore that strong converses hold for all memoryless systems. Extending these results to the case when the communication between the observer and detector takes place over a noisy communication channel is an interesting avenue for future research.
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We will first prove (11). For γ > 0, define the following sets,
Then, we can write
Next, note that
for sufficiently large n, since Q(I X (X n , δ) = 1)
for sufficiently large n for some γ > 0. We can bound the term in (89) as follows.
Let PỸ denote the type of y n and define
Then, for y n ∈ T n [Q Y ]γ , arbitraryγ > 0 and n sufficiently large, we have
From (89), (91) and (92), it follows that
We next show that E (n) (δ, γ) > 0 for sufficiently small δ > 0 and γ > 0. This would imply that the R.H.S of (96) converges to 0 (forγ small enough), thus proving (11). We can write,
whereQ
Here, (97) follows due to the convexity of KL divergence (98) is due to Pinsker's inequality [37] . We also have from the properties of total variation that,
where k 2 (δ) = O(δ). Hence,
Since P X = Q X , E (n) (δ, γ) > 0 for sufficiently small γ > 0 and δ > 0. This completes the proof of (11).
We next prove (13) . Similar to (89) and (90), we have,
since P (I X (X n , δ) = 0)
for someγ n (n) − − → 0. Here, (101) follows due to the facts that P (I X (X n , δ) = 0)
0,γ with γ sufficiently small. Thus, from (99), (100) and (101), we can write for some γ > 0 that,
This completes the proof of (13) . The proof of (12) is exactly same as (13), with the only difference that the sets B We will present a random coding scheme, and analyze the resulting type 1 and type 2 error probabilities followed by the equivocation of private part S n at the detector over the ensemble of all randomly generated codebooks. We mention here that unless specified otherwise, the mutual information and entropy terms appearing in the proof below, like for example, I(U ; W ), I(U ; W |V ), H(W |V ) etc. are computed with respect to the joint distribution induced under the null hypothesis,
i.e., P SU V W = P SU V P W |U .
Codebook Generation:
Fix a conditional distribution P W |U , and positive numbers δ , δ , δ andδ (arbitrarily small subject to the delta-convention [37] and certain other constraints that will be specified in the course of the proof). Generate e n(I(U ;W )+δ ) independent sequences W n (j), j ∈ e n(I(U ;W )+δ ) randomly according to the distribution
Denote this codebook by C n .
Encoding: The encoder f (n) : U n → [e nR ] is deterministic with output M , which is chosen as follows. If I(U ; W ) + δ > R, the encoder performs uniform random binning on the sequences W n (j), j ∈ e n(I(U ;W )+δ ) in C n , i.e., for each codeword in C n , it selects an index uniformly at random from the set [e nR ]. Denote the bin assignment by C n B and the bin index selected for W n (j) by f B (j). If the observed sequence U n is typical, i.e., U n ∈ T
, the encoder first looks for a sequence
If there exists multiple such codewords, it chooses one of the index J among them uniformly at random and outputs the bin-index M = f B (J), M ∈ [1 : e nR ] or M = J depending on whether
or such an index J does not exist, the encoder outputs the error message
Decoding: If M = 0,Ĥ = 1 is declared. Else, given M = 0 and V n , the detector looks for a typical
We next analyze the Type 1 and Type 2 error probabilities achieved by the above scheme (in the limit δ, δ ,δ → 0).
Analysis of Type 1 error:
A type 1 error occurs only if one of the following events happen.
Hence, the Type 1 error can be upper bounded as
h ) ≤ P(E|H = 0).
E T E tends to 0 asymptotically by the weak law of large numbers. Note that given E c T E holds, U n ∈ T [P U ] δ and by the covering lemma [37, Lemma 9.1], it is well known that E EE tends to 0 doubly exponentially for δ > δ and δ appropriately chosen. Given E c EE ∩ E c T E holds, it follows from the Markov chain relation V − U − W and the Markov lemma [42] , that P(E M E ) tends to zero as n → ∞ forδ > δ (appropriately chosen). Furthermore,
Hence, P(E DE ) tends to zero as n → ∞ provided that R > I(U ; W |V ), which in turn implies from the union bound that
Analysis of Type 2 error: A type 2 error occurs only if
and E EE does not occur. Hence, we can restrict the type 2 error analysis to only such (U n , V n ). Denote the event that a type 2 error happens by D 0 . Let
The type 2 error probability can be written as
Let
The last term in (103) can be upper bounded as follows.
Thus, we have
By the symmetry of the codebook generation, encoding and decoding procedure, the term P( (105) is independent of the value of J and f B (J). Hence, w.l.o.g., assuming J = 1 and f B (J) = 1, we can write
Given E N E holds, D 0 may occur in two possible ways (i) when an unintended wrong codeword is retrieved from the bin with index M that is jointly typical with V n and (ii) when the correct codeword is jointly typical with V n . We refer to the event in case (i) as the binning error event E BE . More specifically,
Define the following events
The last term in (106) can be expressed as follows.
For the case I(U ; W ) > R, E BE happens when a wrong codeword W n (l), l = J is retrieved from the bin with index M by the empirical entropy decoder such that
, there exists a codeword in the bin with index M having empirical entropy strictly less than H(W |V ). Hence, the decoded codewordŴ
Consequently, a Type 2 error can happen under the event E BE only when H(W |Ṽ ) ≥ H(W |V ). The probability of the event E BE can be upper bounded under this condition as
We proceed to analyze the R.H.S of (104) which upper bounds the type 2 error β(f (n) , ), in the limit n → ∞ and δ, δ ,δ → 0. From (106), it follows that
Similar to that in [13] , rewriting the summation in (113) as the sum over the types and sequences within a type, we obtain
Since H 1 is the true underlying hypothesis, we have
where PŨṼW denotes the type of the sequence (u n , v n , w n ).
With (112) and (115), we have the necessary machinery to analyze (114). First, consider that the event E N E ∩ E c BE holds.
In this case,
Thus, the following terms in (114) can be simplified (in the limit δ,δ → 0) as
To obtain (117), we used (115) and (116). This results in the term E 1 (P W |U ) in (18) .
Next, consider the terms corresponding to the event E N E ∩ E BE in (114). Note that given the event
. Using these facts to simplify the terms corresponding to the event E N E ∩ E BE in (114), we obtain similar to [13] ,
Also, note that E BE occurs only when I(U ; W ) > R. This completes the analysis of the T2EE.
Next, we lower bound the equivocation of S n at the adversary as follows. Assume H = 0. Let
we have
for some γ 0n Next, assume that H = 1 and
Then, by the weak law of large numbers and covering theorem [42] , it follows that
Consequently, P(M = 0|H = 1)
− − → 1. Thus, we can write
for some γ 1n
− − → 0. Eqn. (126) follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 in [44] 
Now, assume that H = 1 and Q U = P U . Then, it follows that for some 0 < γ < D(P U ||Q U ),
Recalling that I U (u
, we can write
for some γ 2n 
which in turn follows from Lemma 6 and 7. Thus, we have shown that (R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) ∈ R e ( ), ∈ (0, 1), provided that (14)- (17) are satisfied, and by the random coding argument, there exists a deterministic codebook that achieves this tuple.
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The generation of the codebook C n and the random coding method for analysis is the same as in Theorem 8. However,
with output M is used at the observer instead of a deterministic encoder. Again, unless specified otherwise, the mutual information and entropy terms appearing in the proof below, like for example, I(U ; W ), I(U ; W |V ), H(W |V ) etc. are computed with respect to the joint distribution P SU V W = P SU V P W |U . As in Theorem 8, δ , δ , δ andδ appearing in the proof below denote arbitrarily small positive numbers subject to delta-convention [37] and certain other constraints that will be specified in the course of the proof.
Encoding: For a given codebook C n , define a conditional probability distribution
If I(U ; W ) + δ + |U ||W| log(n+1) n > R, the encoder performs uniform random binning on the sequences W n (j), j ∈ e n(I(U ;W )+δ ) in C n , i.e., for each codeword in C n , it selects an index uniformly at random from the set e
Denote the bin assignment by C n B and the bin index selected for W n (j) by f B (j). If the observed sequence U n is typical,
, then the encoder outputs the message
depending on whether I(U ; W ) + δ + |U ||W| log(n+1) n > R or otherwise, where J ∈ [e n(I(U ;W )+δ ) ] is selected according to the probability P Eu (j|u n , C n ) and T denotes the index of the joint type of (U n , W n (J)) in the set of types T n (U × W). If
, the encoder outputs the error message M = 0.
,Ĥ = 1 is declared. Else, given M = 0 and V n , the detector looks for a typical
We next analyze the average of the Type 1 and Type 2 error probabilities achieved by the above scheme (in the limit δ, δ ,δ → 0) over all random codebooks C n and C n B .
Analysis of Type 1 error:
The system induced distribution when H = 0 is given bỹ
Consider two auxiliary distributionΨ and Ψ defined as
Note that the distributionsP (0) , Ψ (0) andΨ (0) defined are random variables and depend on the codebook realization C n and the binning assignment. Also, observe that the stochastic encoder is chosen such that P Eu (j|u n , C n ) = Ψ (0) (j|u n ) and hence, the only difference between the joint distribution Ψ (0) andΨ (0) is the marginal distribution of U n . By the soft-covering lemma [38] [40], it follows that for some γ 1 > 0,
Hence, from (136) and the properties of total variation, we have
where the distributions Ψ (0) andΨ (0) are over the r.v.'s given in (134). Also, note that the only difference between the
− − → 0, it follows that for some {γ 2n } n∈Z + such that γ 2n
Eqns. (137) and (138) together imply that
This means that the system distributionP (0) induced by encoding and decoding operations (when H 0 is the true hypothesis)
can be approximated by that under Ψ (0) . LetP (1) andΨ (1) be defined by the R.H.S. of (132), (133) and (134), with P SU V replaced by Q SU V . Let Ψ (1) denote the R.H.S. of (135) with P V S|U replaced by Q V S|U . Note that under joint distribution
Also, since I(U ; W ) + δ > 0, by the application of soft-covering lemma,
for some γ 4 > 0. From (135), (139) and (141),
by the weak law of large numbers. A type 1 error occurs only if one of the following events happen.
Hence, the type 1 error can be upper bounded as
To obtain (147), we used the fact that P Eu (1|u n , C n ) in (131) is invariant to the joint type T PŨW of (U n , W n (1)) = (u n , w n )
(keeping all the other codewords fixed), which in turn implies that given E N E and the type PŨ of U n = u n , each sequence in the conditional type T PW |Ũ is equally likely (in the randomness induced by the random codebook generation and stochastic encoding in (131)) and its probability is upper bounded by
| . The analysis of the other terms in (146) is the same as in Theorem 8 and results in similar factors in the T2EE. Hence, it is omitted. Therefore, by the random coding argument, there exists a sequence of deterministic codebooks (C n , C n B ) such that it achieves the T2EE given in (15) and satisfies the type 1 error probability constraint , (142), (139) and (141). Using these codebooks for coding (at the encoder and decoder), we next lower bound the average distortion of S n at the adversary decoder as follows.
First consider that the null hypothesis holds. Then,
Here, (148) follows from (139) and boundedness of distortion measure; (149) follows from (140); (150) follows from (141) and the fact that Ψ (0)
. Next, consider that the alternate hypothesis holds and that Q U = P U . Then, from the soft-covering lemma, it again follows that
where the distributions Ψ (1) andΨ (1) are over the r.v.'s given in (134). Also, note that the only difference between the
Eqns. (152) and (153) together imply that
This means that the system distributionP (1) induced by encoding and decoding operations when H 1 is the true hypothesis can be approximated by that under Ψ (1) . Then,
Now, consider the case H = 1 and Q U = P U . Then, it follows that for some 0 < γ < D(P U ||Q U ),
Here, (158) follows from Lemma 7. Thus, we have shown that (R, κ, (14), (15), (20) and (21) are satisfied. This completes the proof of the theorem.
APPENDIX D ONE-HELPER LOSSLESS SOURCE CODING PROBLEM WITH A PRIVACY CONSTRAINT
Here, we show the equivalence between the one-helper lossless source coding problem with a privacy constraint shown in Fig. 2 and the HT with a privacy constraint problem. In the one-helper lossless source coding problem with a privacy constraint, the main encoder f (n) y resp. helper encoder f (n) sends the messageM (resp. M ) based on its observation Y n (resp. U n ) to the legitimate decoder g (n) y through a noiseless channel with rate constraint R y (resp. R). The goal of the legitimate decoder
is to reconstruct Y n losslessly using the received indices M andM as well as its side information Z n . This is a source coding with coded side information problem, studied in [45] . However, in our case, there is an additional sequence S n and an adversary decoder g (n) r which has access to (M, Y n , Z n ). The goal is to keep S n private from the adversary decoder such that (3) (resp. (4)) is satisfied when average distortion (resp. equivocation) is the measure of privacy. Note that the adversary decoder has access to all the information that the legitimate decoder has. Hence, protecting S n cannot depend on coding techniques that are based on the adversary partially missing data (or having a noisier channel), as is common in many physical layer security related works. We measure the privacy of S n at the adversary decoder under two cases, namely, when the joint distribution of the r.v.'s (S n , U n , Y n , Z n ) is (i) 
and ( 
Similarly, let R (n) e = {(R, κ, Ω 0 , Ω 1 )} such that there exists f (n) : U n → e nR satisfying (161), (163) and
The next theorem provides a multi-letter characterization ofR d andR e .
Theorem 18. LetR
denote the set of (R, R y , ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) tuples such that (162), (163) and
are satisfied. Similarly, letR (n) e denote the set of (R, R y , Ω 0 , Ω 1 ) tuples such that (163), (164) and (165) are satisfied. Then,
Proof: We first prove (166). For the achievability part, consider the following scheme.
Encoding: Fix n and f (n) : U n → PM |U n satisfying (162). For j ∈ Z + , upon observing u nj , the helper encoder transmits the super-message M = (M (1), . . . , M (j)), where each M (j) ∈ [e nR ] is selected independently according to PM |U n =u n (j) .
The main encoder f nj y : Y nj → {1, 2, · · · , e njRy } performs uniform random binning on Y nj , i.e., for each observed sequence v nj , an indexM is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, · · · , e njRy }.
Decoding: On receiving M andM , the legitimate decoder checks for a unique sequenceŶ nj such that f y (Ŷ nj ) =M and
. If successful, it outputs g (nj) (M,M , Z nj ) =Ŷ nj . Else, an error is declared.
Analysis of the probability of error: The following events may result in an error at the legitimate decoder.
By the joint typicality lemma [42] , P r(E 1 ) → 0 as j → ∞. Also, Hence, P(E 2 ) → 0 as j → ∞ if R y > H(Y n |M , Z n ) + δ. Note that (Z n , Y n ) − U n −M . Also, defining l(k, n) := k − n k n , we can write,
Here, (168) follows since M (j), Y jn (j−1)n+1 , Z jn (j−1)n+1 j∈Z + forms an i.i.d. sequence. Taking limit k → ∞, we obtain lim inf
Thus, if (R, R y , ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 ) ∈R Similarly, for fixed f (n) that satisfies (164), and M = (M (1), M (2), . . .) as before, we have
Thus,
and it follows that cl R (n)
e ⊆R e .
For the converse, we have by Fano's inequality that H(Y n |M , M, Z n ) ≤ γ n , where γ n → 0 as n → ∞. Hence, we obtain
Noting that (Z n , Y n ) − U n − M , M ∈ [e nR ] and (162) (resp. (164)) holds for any achievable scheme, it follows that
resp. int R e ⊆R n e
. Taking closure, this implies that
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Next, we prove an inner and outer bound for R d ( ) and R e ( ) in terms of multi-letter expressions. The inner bound holds for all ∈ (0, 1), while the outer bound holds only when → 0.
Theorem 19.
cl ∪ n R (n) e ⊆ R e ( ), ∀ ∈ (0, 1),
Proof: For simplicity, denote by V the r.v.'s (Y, Z). We will prove that for all ∈ (0, 1),
